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During the 1980s, West German public life witnessed a near explosion of historical 
debates, some fought out in professional journals, but most of them making their way into the 
mass media as well. As much as reflecting a discord about the past itself - "what did actually 
happen?" - many of the quarrels centred around the place of the past in the present. How 
should the past be remembered? How does it relate to the present, and how should it function 
as a point of orientation for the future? 
These were some of the fundamental issues in the debates over Chancellor Kohl's 
plans for the House of History in Bonn and the German Historical Museum in Berlin. The 
people involved in the planning were faced with the problem of representations of the past: 
what aspects of German history should be emphasised, and could such a discontinuous 
history be presented in a coherent museum at all? And crucially, what place should the Nazi 
years be given? Historians on the political Left were especially critical since they saw the 
whole project as the Kohl government's disguised attempt at creating a more positive national 
identity, backed up by conservative historians with the same aim.1  
Other debates evolved around the anniversaries in 1983 and 1985. 1983 marked the 
50th anniversary of the Nazi seizure of power, and 1985, the 40th anniversary of the end of 
the Second World War and the Allied liberation of the Nazi death camps. How should these 
dates be commemorated? The latter anniversary especially turned into a point of vehement 
public debate as it became connected with the official state visit by the American President 
Ronald Reagan. Reagan’s words " I don't think we ought to focus on the past. I want to focus 
on the future. I want to put that history behind me "2 made it clear that he did not want to 
visit Dachau or any other concentration camp during his stay, as Kohl had suggested. Later 
on, three weeks before Reagan's visit, it was revealed that the planned site of 
commemoration, Kolmeshöhe military cemetery at Bitburg, contained several graves of 
Waffen SS soldiers. Despite massive political pressure, especially from Jewish groups, the 
plans were not altered, though a visit to the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp was included. 
Reagan defended the plans by saying of the SS-soldiers: " They were victims, just as surely 
as the victims in the concentration camps."3 The subsequent dispute became known as the 
Bitburg affair. A range of reactions were articulated in articles from March to May 1985. 
What should have been the celebration of V-E Day was instead described as a political 
failure which blurred dividing lines between victim and victimiser, and unsuccessfully 
equated reconciliation and revisionism, while questioning relevance of the Nazi past. 
This all led to the controversy that broke out the following year, the Historikerstreit , 
which can only be understood in the above context.4 The Historikerstreit will be the focus of 
this paper. It was revealing of West Germany's attempts at coming to terms with the Nazi 
past. The controversy seemed to suggest that it still occupied an important place in West 
German political culture. Moreover, it highlighted central themes that can be traced to a 
larger context of post-war German historiography. 
 
This paper seeks to address some central issues of the Historikerstreit. The initial 
arguments that triggered off the controversy will be outlined and discussed in relation to 
central trends in post-war West German historiography. Finally, the paper elaborates on how 
 Jacob Westergaard Madsen  
‘The Vividness of the Past: A Retrospect on the West German Historikerstreit in the mid-1980s’  
University of Sussex Journal of Contemporary History, 1 (2000) 
2
 
the Historikerstreit relates to questions pertaining to the relationship between history, 
national identity and politics. 
Given the breadth of the issues raised by the controversy it is impossible, within the 
scope of this paper, to give a full account of the arguments put forward during the debate. In 
the following I will only introduce the very initial articles by the main characters that sparked 
off the debate. Then, when elaborating on the larger contexts in which the Historikerstreit 
can be located, I will return to later articles and arguments to the extent that they seem 
relevant to the discussion. It should also be made clear that I have been very selective 
concerning the contexts within which I locate the controversy. In general, I have avoided the 
parts of the Historikerstreit that I find over-influenced by Cold War logic, and instead 
focused on aspects that still seem to be of central importance in today's re-unified Germany. 
 
I 
As the context suggests, a lot of factors influenced the emergence of the controversy. 
However, the catalyst for the series of articles known as the Historikerstreit was an article of 
June 6, 1986 in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung called "The Past That Will Not Pass".5 The 
author was the philosophy trained historian Ernst Nolte. I will give a thorough account of the 
content of this article as references were made to it time and again during the subsequent 
controversy. Nolte's main point was that, unlike other pasts that lose their vividness as time 
goes by, the Nazi past still seemed to preoccupy contemporary West German consciousness 
in a very vital and dominant way. Especially the memories of the Final Solution made it 
unlikely to pass because of the scale of the crime. However, Nolte insinuated that one of the 
important reasons of the inability of the past to pass might be that it served certain interests: 
the persecuted who enjoyed the privileged status of the victim, or the new generation who 
used it as a point of accusation of "the fathers".6 Thus it functioned as a kind of anti-myth, or 
bugaboo, which had the negative effect of diverting attention away from more present 
problems.7 Therefore, in order to become able to focus on the present rather than the past, it 
was about time to treat the Nazi years with equality to other pasts; only in this way could the 
black-and-white image of these years become the object of a more dissociated study.  
Nolte paired his plea with a re-interpretation of the origins of the war in the East by 
putting forward a preventive-war thesis. According to this, Nazi Germany had basically 
adopted its barbarism from the USSR, and the attack in 1941 was to a large extent explained 
by the fear of becoming the next victims of the Red Terror. Likewise, the extermination of 
the Jews was a biological copy of the social exterminism practised by the Bolsheviks. In this 
connection Nolte criticised the historians of National Socialism for failing to realise the 
causal nexus between Auschwitz and the Gulag Archipelago in Stalin's Russia. As 
contemporary reports of the horrifying Red Terror in the 1920s reflects, the Nazis were not 
wholly innovative, though their genocidal policy was more technical, and in this sense 
unique.8 In other words, what Nolte was saying was that with the passage of time the 
question of guilt lost its significance and a more functionalistic perspective could be adopted. 
Reactions followed soon after. The philosopher Jürgen Habermas wrote one of the 
first and sharpest critiques,9 in which he lumped Nolte together with two other conservative 
historians, Andreas Hillgruber and Michael Stürmer. Habermas saw these historians as 
typical exponents of the Tendenzwende in West German intellectual life which tried to 
embrace history in order to encourage a more positive national identity. One of the means, 
according to Habermas, was to "normalise" the Nazi past through dubious comparisons to the 
crimes of other 20th century dictatorships:10 hence the title, "Apologetic Tendencies". Earlier 
in 1986, Hillgruber had had an essay published in which he argued that the Jewish 
catastrophe, the extermination in the concentration camps, was countered by a German 
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catastrophe, the extermination and expulsion of millions of ethnic Germans in the East by the 
end of the war. Thus the Jewish catastrophe was relativised, not only by the German 
catastrophe, but also by other genocides, e.g. in Stalin's Russia or Pol Pot's Cambodia. 
Furthermore, Hillgruber called for a historicist identification with the German armies in the 
East who had acted heroically to protect the German population against the violent attacks 
from the barbaric Bolsheviks. According to him, most of the soldiers and the army leaders 
had known nothing about the horrors that meanwhile were being committed in the 
concentration camps.11 Habermas read such interpretations as a contribution to the 
contemporary ideological struggle for the past, a struggle which Stürmer, Kohl's former 
speech writer, had also joined with his call for a unified German historical consciousness. I 
shall return to this in the third part of this paper. 
With Habermas' response the controversy really took off. An enormous number of 
articles were published in the summer and autumn of 1986, especially in Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung and Die Zeit . After this followed a second wave of books and longer 
academic articles, this time also joined by English, American, and Israeli historians.12 The 
main questions centred around the uniqueness of Auschwitz, West German commitment to 
the West, and most centrally, the place of National Socialism in German history and its 
meaning for the identity of the Federal Republic13 . The clearest rejection of the attempts at 
'relativising comparison' came from Eberhard Jäckel in Die Zeit 12 September, 1986: "...the 
Nazi murder of the Jews was unique because never before has a state decided and 
announced, on the authority of its responsible leader, that it intended to kill in its entirety, as 
far as possible, a particular group of human beings, including its old people, women, 
children, and infants, and then put this decision into action with every possible instrument of 
power available to the state."14 This seems to have reflected the view of the majority of those 
participants who went against the conservatives; the comparative method is useful, but 
should not lead to complete equation. 
 
II 
There seems to have been general agreement that the Historikerstreit did not 
engender new historical knowledge.15 The questions in dispute did not so much concern the 
historical events themselves as to which frame of interpretation to apply. Rather, the 
controversy was political, as reflected in the various accusations of 'apologetic tendencies' 
(Habermas), 'interests at stake' (Nolte), and 'progressive strangulation of history by the Left' 
(Stürmer). This explains why some of the participants who basically applied similar 
methodologies to their studies of the past took very opposite standpoints in the debate. 
Though the political connotations of this particular controversy were very clear, the 
relationship between historiography and political interests was, of course, not a novelty as 
such. The so-called Fischer-debate in the 1960s is a case in point. It deserves brief attention 
as it also points towards the Sonderweg thesis whose line of argument, I would argue, serves 
to illuminate certain aspects of the Historikerstreit. 
Like the Historikerstreit , the Fischer-debate took place some 40 years after its object 
of dispute. The debate was triggered off by the historian Fritz Fischer's claim about the 
origins of the First World War. According to Fischer, these could to a large extent be 
explained by long held German dreams of imperial expansion - 'a place in the sun'. What was 
really disturbing about Fischer's thesis, however, was that it suggested a larger continuity of 
aggressive, authoritarian rule of Germany at a time when the then divided nation was still 
recovering from the subsequent world war. Published in 1961, the same year as the 
construction of the Berlin Wall, Germany's Aims in the First World War, as Fischer's book 
was entitled, stated that the erroneous policy could not just be reduced to twelve years from 
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1933 to 1945. Thus it re-addressed the question of Germany's war guilt from the First World 
War, implicitly blaming Germany for a major share of the misery of the first half of the 20th 
century, though not mentioning Nazism once. In this sense it related to the critical Sonderweg 
thesis which gained power around the same time as Fischer's book was published. The notion 
of a special German path of development also implied emphasis on the longer lasting 
structures that paved the way for the Nazis. Thus it sought to answer the question, also 
central in the Historikerstreit , of how to locate Nazism and Auschwitz in German history. 
Likewise it implied, and still does imply, a comparative perspective: how did Germany 
deviate from the general Western development of democratic and parliamentary traditions? 
In 1988 the then West German historian Jürgen Kocka argued for a re-adoption of the 
Sonderweg thesis which, in modified form, he believed still provided a fruitful approach to 
German history.16 Additionally, I would argue that though it may not hold the same narrative 
power today as it did in the 1960s, the Sonderweg thesis provides, together with its counter-
thesis, a framework for an understanding of the central positions of the Historikerstreit.17 Put 
schematically, the thesis regards 1945 as Stunde Null for Germany; not until then could 
(West) Germany turn to the democratic and modern values of the western countries from 
which Germany had hitherto deviated. By emphasising the traditionalism of Nazism the 
supporters of the thesis could refute the values of Prussian militarism, authoritarian rule, 
feudalism, etc. The initial conservative reaction to this interpretation was to emphasise the 
singularity of Nazi anti-Semitism. The structural analysis was rejected and instead the 
personality of Hitler and the dynamic of the Nazi movement was stressed.18 Thus the 
conservatives had, until the Historikerstreit, pointed to the uniqueness of the Third Reich as 
an integral part of their counter-argument. According to this interpretation it was the modern, 
totalitarian aspects of Nazism, that is, its lack of roots in German history, that made it 
special.19 The twelve Nazi years were bracketed, but in no way relativised, as an aberration 
from an otherwise sound historical development. An important reason for the emergence of 
the Historikerstreit was the alteration, or rather the softening, of this latter conservative 
position. 
"The unconditional opening of the Federal republic to the political culture of the 
West is the greatest intellectual achievement of the postwar period; my generation should be 
especially proud of this."20 This often quoted sentence by Habermas expressed a view of 
1945 as Stunde Null. There was nothing new in this standpoint, though it may be surprising 
to hear it expressed in such a praising phrase by the usually very critical Habermas. In 
general, no new standpoints were put forward by the non-conservatives; it was the 
conservatives who called for revision. What Nolte did when he put forward the thesis of 
Hitler as an anti-copy of Stalin and the comparisons to other genocides was, in fact, to depart 
from the traditional conservative position described above. Gone was the stress on the 
internal dynamic of the Nazi movement; it was basically a reaction to Bolshevism. Gone, 
likewise, was the uniqueness of Auschwitz; it was basically an adoption of the Red 
mechanisms of extermination, an 'Asiatic' deed. These statements made the issue of 
comparison central to the debate. It makes sense then, to adopt the American historian 
Charles S. Maier's distinction between 'horizontal' comparison and 'vertical' comparison. 
Whereas the former compares across frontiers, the latter compares through time.21 This 
describes two different ways of dealing with the Nazi past, which are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. In the following, it will be argued that the conservative historians 
adopted the horizontal comparative perspective while neglecting the vertical. 
Nolte's emphasis on the deeper roots of the Nazi genocide - the Gulag Archipelago - 
made it an external problem, rather than internal. Likewise, his comparisons to other 
genocides made Auschwitz lose its uniqueness. To be fair, Nolte did hold that Auschwitz was 
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qualitatively different from anything else, but his insistence to see causal links between the 
mass murders in the 20th century still had the effect of diverting attention from the specific 
German case which, after all, was Nolte's main concern. I am not going to enter the 
discussion of the trivialising effects of Nolte's comparisons; they have been extensively dealt 
with elsewhere.22 Rather, I will point to a paradox in Nolte's approach. Figuratively speaking, 
he wanted to lift the brackets that had hitherto surrounded the Nazi years in the conservative 
narrative. His method was horizontal comparison. But unlike the Sonderweg 'model' which 
compares Germany's deviating past with the past of its present allies through time, Nolte 
compared Germany's crimes with the crimes of other non-western states which were not even 
potential ideological allies in the present. Moreover, he never really returned to Germany 
after making his comparisons across frontiers except from an unspecified claim that the 
genocidal acts of the Nazis were qualitatively different from the Bolshevik acts.23 His mainly 
functionalistic view made it a general problem, rather than a specifically German one.  
Like Nolte, Hillgruber was accused of diverting attention from internal German 
questions by focusing on external, secondary factors.24 In particular, his focus on the long 
standing plans of the Allies to expel the Germans from East-Central Europe was the object of 
much criticism. Not the focus as such, but the way that it was given quantitative primacy 
over the German extermination of the Jews in Hillgruber's account, as measured in numbers 
of pages. Likewise, observers noted a shift in tone when Hillgruber turned to the Jewish 
catastrophe; it was described in more analytic and dissociated language than the German 
catastrophe.25 This points towards a general characteristic of the historiography of Nazi 
Germany, especially the Holocaust: the importance of style, choosing words and phrases with 
precision because of the sensitivity of the topic. To me the Hillgruber and Nolte texts that 
were in dispute were marked by disproportionate emphases within the comparative 
framework. Furthermore, neither clearly stated the purpose of such comparisons. I would 
argue, with Maier, that historical comparisons are necessary; the uniqueness of Auschwitz is 
not communicable without plausible, even if imperfect, analogies.26 But the purpose must be 
to gain more precise, more nuanced knowledge, not to blur important distinctions. The 
historical comparisons that raised the Historikerstreit , paired with the plea for a more 
positive identification with the state, justified Habermas accusation of 'apologetic tendencies'. 
The suspicion was not ungrounded that anticommunist views influenced the historical 
accounts to an unacceptable extent in the scholarly world.27  
The issue of relating the memory of the Nazi experience to the fear of the USSR, (that 
is, relating it to external factors rather than internal), dated back further than the 
Historikerstreit. Already in 1959 the Frankfurt philosopher Theodor W. Adorno gave a 
lecture addressing the problem of coming to terms with the past.28 Adorno acknowledged the 
threat from the East but considered the continued existence of National Socialism within 
democracy as a much more disturbing danger.29 To be sure, some things had changed by 
1986, but Adorno pointed to a certain tendency that Nolte and Hillgruber still represented 
more than 25 years later. Insisting on the necessity of looking inwards as the only way of 
working through the past (Aufarbeitung), Adorno noted the way that the post-war 
development of international politics had changed the view on the legacy of the war in the 
East: "It appears to offer retrospective justification for the attack that Hitler launched 
against the Soviet Union."30 From this point, Adorno feared, it was only a short step to the 
extrapolation that Hitler was also right about other things. To me, Adorno's notion of 
retrospective justification sheds light on the way that Nolte and Hillgruber were reading the 
present back into the past - although they both claimed to do the opposite. In fact, one of the 
central points of critique in the Historikerstreit was that Nolte, Hillgruber, et al., had 
extended the limits of respectability; far-right beliefs were becoming mainstream.31 
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Furthermore, Adorno's uneasy feelings about the apparent merger of such historical 
revisionism with nationalism serves as a bridge to the third and last part of this paper. I will 
start by going back even further than Adorno's lecture. 
 
III 
In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War the renowned historian 
Friedrich Meinecke, more than 80 years old at the time, wrote a book called The German 
Catastrophe.32 Writing in the ruins of occupied Germany, Meinecke tried to save something 
out of the wreck, striving to understand what had gone so terribly wrong in his fatherland. In 
his account of the century leading up to the Nazi seizure of power, the tension between 
Kultur and Civilisation was ever present. Meinecke described, and deplored, how the cultural 
liberalism of the Goethe era had slowly given way to the calculating and militant Realpolitik 
of the later unified Germany that betrayed all its promises - homo sapiens turning into homo 
faber.33 Thus the main concern of the book, in addition to coming to terms with the Nazi 
experience, was to raise the question of how to re-establish the spirit of a more distant, more 
positive past. In this sense Meinecke's question was echoed by, not least, Michael Stürmers 
call 40 years later for a renewed pride and patriotism. 
Stürmer's arguments were shaped by Cold War concerns about taking a clear stand 
against the Communist threat from the East. In order not to reawaken "the German question" 
that might weaken the NATO alliance, it was necessary to encourage a predictable national 
identity based on a clear vision of continuity between past, present and future. In this 
connection Stürmer recalled Karl Jasper's observation from 1930: "There is nothing that is 
not questionable".34 By drawing a clear analogy to a time when a lack of orientation 
prevailed, Stürmer indicated that the spirit of 'ecological pacifism'35 might lead to a new 
situation of instability and vulnerability. Only this time, the totalitarian threat to democracy 
came from the Communist ideology. Hence the necessity of a strengthened national identity 
as a moral bulwark against the enemy in the East. This call for a historically based national 
identity engaged Meinecke's questions. 
Stürmer and Meinecke were connected in the sense that they both sought to overcome 
the twelve Nazi years by reclaiming a language of nationalism that had been damaged by the 
National Socialists. It was a problem of special magnitude for Meinecke, writing just after 
the war. How could the vocabulary of Volk, Geist and Vaterland be used at all? This was to 
become a general problem for German historians writing national history after 1945. 
Meinecke's aim was to show that these words had an older history than Nazism and dated 
back to previous centuries and positive connotations. Thus the way out of the misery, 
according to Meinecke, was to rediscover the humanitarian, Christian heritage usurped by 
one-dimensional militarism of the latest decades.36 Apart from the Christian element, 
Stürmer argued roughly along the same lines as Meinecke. When he referred to Germany as a 
'Land without History', he meant rather that there was too much of one history and too little 
of others. His call for Sinnstiftung as the answer to the present "lack of orientation"37 faced 
the same problem: how to deal with the enormity of the Nazi crimes? On one hand, I think it 
was fair to state that all German history should not be seen through the lens of Nazi 
Germany; if all pre-1933 events are seen as leading straight to the Final Solution, one ends 
up in what Geoff Eley has called 'retroactive determinism'.38 On the other hand, Stürmer 
related the lack of orientation to the 'strangulation of history by the left'; that is, anti-fascism 
weighed too heavily over anti-communism, in Stürmer's view. When one takes the so-called 
Tendenzwende into consideration, this looked rather like the spectre of 1968 haunting 
Stürmer. I would argue that this revealed a paradox in Stürmer's thinking. He called on 
history as a general source of national identity, but at the same time he wanted to be the 
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custodian of which history to in- and exclude. In my view, Charles Maier has offered the 
most valid criticism of this standpoint: "...insofar as a collection of people wishes to claim 
existence as a society or nation, it must thereby accept existence as a community through 
time, hence must acknowledge that acts committed by earlier agents still bind or burden the 
contemporary community."39 Exactly because Stürmer wanted history, and not, for instance, 
religion or something else, to be the pillar in his renewed nationalism, it was incoherent not 
to accept the burden of the most disturbing era of this history. 
John Torpey has argued that an important aspect of the Historikerstreit was the 
question of the meaning of West Germany's incorporation into the West.40 Thus a central 
disagreement between Stürmer and Habermas was whether commitment to the West meant 
NATO or Enlightenment ideas. I would change the focus a little bit, however, since 
Habermas' ideas on this matter also were, and still are, reflected in his view on national 
identity and historiography. Habermas’ concept of a post-conventional identity was central in 
his rejection of his opponents’ call for a new patriotism. I will shift to a larger perspective 
and show how his critique of Stürmer related to his critical view of two great features of 
German historical thought. 
First, the critique of the new conservative nationalism corresponded to Habermas' 
view on Hegel's concept of national identity. According to this concept, national self-
consciousness is 'the internal reflection of the existing external institutions which constitute 
the nation in its particularity'.41 This counters Habermas' post-conventional identity in two 
ways. The internal reflection of the existing institutions excludes a critical stand in the 
Enlightenment spirit. Likewise, the particularity of the nation is contrary to what Habermas 
in the Historikerstreit expressed as the only way not to be alienated from the West: " A 
commitment to universalistic constitutional principles which is anchored by conviction...";42 
hence the term 'constitutional patriotism'. 
Second, the critique of Stürmer's methods for a renewed nationalism corresponded to 
Habermas' view on historicism. According to Habermas, the state legitimising historicism 
which dominated German historical thought for so long did not survive the Nazi period 
"because of its proven impotence against or even complicity with the Nazi regime."43 Thus it 
was substituted by a more pluralist approach in the 1950s. However, when Habermas 
charged Stürmer with advocating a more unified picture of history through the notion of 
Sinnstiftung , he accused him of a revival of the nationalist aspirations of historicism. 
"Historical consciousness as a substitute for religion - isn't this old dream of historiography 
really asking too much of historiography?"44 Thus Habermas, with his universalistic 
Enlightenment principles, could reject a historical approach that served narrow, political 
purposes. History should not be engaged in providing national identity, rather it should be a 
critical enterprise. In principle I agree with such a view, but if one looks at today's re-unified 
Germany, how does the picture look then? Are the Germans spiritually unified by a common 
commitment to the post-conventional, constitutional principles of the Enlightenment, or does 
a phenomenon such as collective memory still play a role? Or maybe one should rather talk 
of a divided memory; in a recent study Jeffrey Herf has pointed to the way that post-war 
political memory functioned as a means of constructing democracy and dictatorship, 
respectively. That is, the memory of the Nazi past divided along political lines.45 Such 
memories do not just disappear, regardless of their politicised character. 
To finish, rather than conclude, I will suggest that a lot of the issues on the agenda of 
the Historikerstreit still have relevance today. The re-unification of Germany a decade ago 
raised a range of questions concerning history, national identity and collective memory 
which, ten years later, still seem to be very crucial. Re-unification took place under the 
shadow of a national memory which had only existed from 1871 (in large part within 
 Jacob Westergaard Madsen  
‘The Vividness of the Past: A Retrospect on the West German Historikerstreit in the mid-1980s’  
University of Sussex Journal of Contemporary History, 1 (2000) 
8
 
unstable borders) and which seemed to be totally dominated by the Nazi experience. 
Moreover, the question of which shared values unite the Germans was highlighted after forty 
Cold War years of separation of East and West. Forty years of contentious historical 
narratives is a long time. But as the Historikerstreit showed, history could not unite the 
minds of the Federal Republic. Given this background, I believe that the plurality of 
viewpoints expressed in the controversy could serve as an ideal of what history should be 
about: To display the past in all its ambiguity and its vivid relation to the present in order to 
provide a more complex and yet revealing portrayal of events. 
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